The Resilience and Response of Farm Households in the Aftermath of the 2006 Canterbury Snow Storm
Perception of government response
Civil Defence’s perception
Civil Defence believe that, compared with other storms, the storm of 12 June 2006 was not as severe in its impact because of when it occurred. Snow is ‘expected’ in the region and most farmers were to some extent prepared, so stock losses were not significant. It would have been much worse if the same storm had occurred during lambing. However, due to snow falling to sea level, the 2007 storm affected many more people, including those in urban areas, whereas, for example, the 1992 storm affected mainly hill country farmers. Consequently Civil Defence was stretched and had to deal with many more people, both urban and rural.
While as discussed later in this report, many farmers remain totally disillusioned by the response of Civil Defence, the organisation itself believe that it coped pretty well with the snow storm, and that farmers and others were happy with its response and involvement:
“The situation did not warrant 24 hour surveillance, so we shut down operations at night.”
And:
“There seemed to be very little criticism of Civil Defence, such as letters to the editor.” (Civil Defence Coordinator)
However, it is acknowledged that improvements can always be made.
The Mackenzie district also received some assistance from the army. Twenty personnel and four Unimogs arrived on Thursday 15 June to assist with snow raking and, as in the Manawatu floods of 2004, the availability and participation of the armed forces in this relief capacity proved invaluable.
Issues
Communication was a major problem; it was especially difficult to ascertain problems faced by rural communities. Civil Defence flew around properties in helicopters or used four-wheel drive vehicles to check if people were OK, especially in expected problem areas. They did not always land and make ‘personal’ contact but when they did, these visits were greatly appreciated.
Although a radio telephone network existed in the Mackenzie district it was not utilised to its full capacity. Only one operator used it, as it appears the others were too busy dealing with problems on their own farm to check on their neighbours and report back to Civil Defence.
Civil Defence experienced problems, too. The loss of power and phone services reduced their effectiveness in the initial stages and some staff living in rural areas could not get to work as the roads were closed. Mackenzie Civil Defence was told by Telecom that it (Telecom) could not get a generator for the cell phone tower, so Civil Defence sourced their own, took it up Mt Michaels and serviced the cell phone towers, making twice-daily trips with fuel, thereby getting the cell phones going again.
Civil Defence saw two disparate groups in the community:
“Some people were ‘helpers’. Many in the community who had log burners would invite neighbours and friends over for tea. Others were not helpful to others as they were inward looking people concerned about themselves only.” (Civil Defence Coordinator)
Civil Defence highlighted social networks as an importance coping mechanism for farmers, for example, the sharing of generators.
Using local pubs and camping grounds in the region, hot meals and showers were offered by Civil Defence to families with no power. Many people did not take up this offer as they did not know about it. However, many did and there was a lot of good feedback. Some male farmers were initially reluctant to accept these offers, but were often seen later taking advantage of them with their families. Food parcels (including books, games and magazines for both kids and adults, donated by a variety of groups) were also made up and distributed throughout the region by Civil Defence.
Lack of media coverage of its activities was cited by Civil Defence as the reason many people perceived that it was not doing much. From its perspective, Civil Defence was coordinating all the organisations that did get the credit but got little recognition for its work.
Preparedness
Civil Defence believes that some farmers were completely unprepared for a snow (as were many other businesses) and had no contingency plans. Civil Defence mentioned a number of reasons why people were caught un(der)prepared by the snow. Some farmers had become complacent due to the time that had elapsed since the last big snow:
“They had forgotten what it was like.” (Civil Defence Coordinator)
The MetService predicted heavy rain, with snow down to 500 metres; however, it fell to sea level:
“The storm snuck up and caught people unaware.” (Civil Defence Coordinator)
Furthermore, many residents were new to the region, especially dairy farmers, since the last big snow (1992). Some farmers left sheep on the hills too late in the season. Civil Defence explained this largely as a result of the fact that these farmers were new or inexperienced. However, this current investigation found no evidence of such a link. Rather, farmers who left stock out in such circumstances were more often ‘pushing the envelope’ and attempting to minimise the adverse impact on their budget of the dry summer and autumn. It was mentioned that guidelines should be available for farmers to make contingency plans (especially, for example, dairy farmers not used to snow). Such material is already publicly available, but farmer acceptance and use is limited/negligible. Re-publication and distribution of Timaru Civil Defence’s farmer-oriented flyer: Don’t forget our four-legged friends when preparing for an emergency would be an excellent initiative (see Appendix III). It was distributed ten years ago but has not been widely circulated since.
The Ashburton Emergency Response Trust
For many observers the varying degrees of success of different districts in response to the snow bears closer scrutiny. In this context Civil Defence believes that the key to the Ashburton district’s comparative ‘success’ in its response was the Ashburton Emergency Response Trust (AERT). The AERT was set up after the 1992 snow storm and has remained in existence, meeting annually. The AERT works closely with Civil Defence but deals primarily with rural stock issues, while Civil Defence provides communication networks. If AERT comes across humanitarian issues, it passes them to Civil Defence, and Civil Defence passes stock issues to AERT. The AERT had networks established before the snow and knew those people in different agencies who would be important contacts during an adverse event. AERT was geared up by Day 1. For example, by the afternoon of Monday 12 June, AERT arrived at a pig farm with a collapsed roof, providing materials from local businesses for building temporary animal shelter. By the end of the first week AERT had moved over 15,000 stock—at the same time other districts were only just beginning to identify issues. AERT had working capital, so could take a proactive approach, e.g. hiring a helicopter to visit high country stations (AERT was later reimbursed these costs by the government, but had the money available in advance, when needed).
Civil Defence/local government
In many cases the ‘official’ view of how the response was handled by Civil Defence differed from that of the farmers themselves. Farmers’ perceptions ranged from:
“They did a good job under the circumstances” (Intensive sheep farmer), to: “What response?” (Intensive sheep/beef/deer farmer), and: “Appalling, a complete disaster” (Extensive sheep farmer; beef/pig farmer).
Civil Defence did check on some farmers, either by phone on the Monday morning or by helicopter or four-wheel drive vehicle later in the week. Those who were checked by Civil Defence really appreciated it, as it was someone to talk to:
“a link with the outside world” (Extensive sheep farmer).
The farmers understood the difficulties Civil Defence was facing, struggling with issues of no power or phones (making organisation extremely difficult) and the fact that some members themselves were unable to get to work due to living in the country and roads being impassable; hence, there was recognition that Civil Defence could not function according to predetermined plans.
Those who weren’t contacted personally by Civil Defence were often openly hostile about its role. One particularly well-prepared family believed:
[Civil Defence was] “useless and inappropriately equipped for the event.” They were “very disappointed by them” and believed “they need a major reorganisation” (Sheep farmer).
Others believed:
“Civil Defence should have touched base. They did a better job in the 1992 snow.” (Sheep/beef farmer; Dairy farmer)
Interviewees wanted a personal visit and said this would have helped lift their spirits. Many found out later that Civil Defence had in fact flown over their property in a helicopter, seen movement, and ticked them off as coping. This did not improve their view of Civil Defence as they wondered:
“How could Civil Defence possibly tell from a helicopter what problems were happening on the farm or in the home?” (Extensive sheep farmer)
One story was told of a pregnant woman inquiring of Civil Defence what would have happened if she had gone in to labour before the roads to her property were cleared (seven days after the snow). She was told that had she rung Civil Defence they would have sent a helicopter. As phone communication was not restored to the woman’s house for seven days (until the roads were cleared to allow the linesmen access), how could she have contacted Civil Defence, and how could Civil Defence have seen from a helicopter that she was in labour or experiencing complications with the birth?
“We became cynical about Civil Defence’s ability to respond”. (Extensive sheep/deer farmer)
Even some families who were contacted by Civil Defence some four or five days later felt they had been let down as this was too long to wait:
“Civil Defence need better coordination and a quicker response.” (Extensive sheep/deer farmer)
Others felt that they did not need Civil Defence as they had no problems, but wondered what would have happened if they had had difficulties, for example, a farm accident:
“How would Civil Defence have known? How could we have contacted them? They did not check, even when phones came back on.” (Sheep/deer farmer)
Many felt Civil Defence’s organisation was poor and cited the example of snow rakers being taken out at 2:30pm:
“No one checked to see if they got back. They had to walk out in the dark and were very fortunate that nothing bad happened.” (Sheep/beef farmer)
Some complained about the length of time it took to get roads cleared:
“One grader was up-country and another was being serviced. It took too long for them to get moving.” (Sheep/beef farmer)
Others complained that Civil Defence was constrained by financial issues:
“Roads in Fairlie were not cleared properly as the Council ran out of money and told the contractors to stop. The streets in Fairlie were dangerous to drive or walk on, especially for the elderly, and one motel had a mountain of ice in their car park for weeks that had been left there rather than trucking it away.” (Sheep/beef farmer)
Farmers felt that the council needed to be more proactive and should be less concerned with budget constraints.
Some respondents felt that there should have been a priority on people to visit, in particular the elderly, and families with young children. Some farmers commented:
“There was too much showboating for the media, flying around in helicopters dropping off food packages to people we had seen in Fairlie buying groceries three days earlier.” (Intensive sheep farmer)
Equally, some farmers believed that Civil Defence should have declared a state of emergency in order to facilitate access to more government assistance, in particular believing that the army could have been better utilised. Many other farmers believed that the situation did not warrant a full Civil Defence emergency, but that there should be different levels of Civil Defence emergency that could trigger a much faster response than did occur.
Central government
Farmers wanted much quicker recognition of the problem and a quicker response and visits from central government. They expected the government to acknowledge the problem and be prepared to reimburse local councils/Civil Defence for the clean up bill, regardless of the cost (for example, Fairlie’s roads).
Some farms were visited by MAF for feed surveys ten days to three weeks after the snow.
Media
The media presence was an annoyance to some farmers and led, they believe, to publicity stunts and the playing up of the event:
“The media coverage appeared to show Civil Defence doing a lot to help, but the reality was many farmers did not receive any assistance.” (Intensive sheep/deer/beef farmer)
Radio
Although radio reception is patchy throughout the area (but works well in vehicles), many farmers mentioned that they did not know which radio station to use to access Civil Defence ‘advice’. They believed that there needs to be a designated frequency that can be used by Civil Defence in such an event and, importantly, that it be one that has thorough coverage throughout the region, and is known to farmers.
Assistance
Many farmers were not aware that any assistance was available, or did not know how to access assistance. One farmer did get two hours of farm advice paid for by the Snow Relief Fund.
Task Force Green
Copious praise was given to Task Force Green by every farmer interviewed that received their help, except one (who felt he had had to supervise them too much):
“Task Force Green was awesome” (Intensive sheep farmer)
And:
“It took a huge load off our minds and let us concentrate on other things.” (Sheep/deer farmer)
Task Force Green was mainly used to clean up trees that had been damaged by the snow and in some cases they assisted straining-up fences after removing the trees. A number of farmers commented that they would have been happy to contribute to the cost of Task Force Green (rather that just beer), such was the value of the service. Some farmers received up to 50 man days from Task Force Green, and were able to work alongside them with machinery to clear trees that would have been impossible to remove with only one or two labourers. Some commented that they felt Task Force Green was poorly advertised and they had only come across it by chance. Others believed that the potential exists to expand Task Force Green to assist with fencing (perhaps at a reduced cost) and snow raking (if they could be organised immediately) but warned it could become too easy to abuse.
Community assistance
Most farmers had checked on their neighbours by the Monday afternoon; however, only a few farmers were able to actively help their neighbours due to being so busy themselves, and believing that most of their neighbours were coping. Many families loaned camping gear and barbecues, invited neighbours around for meals and hot showers, or loaned generators to charge freezers.
Farmers were more likely to have received help from family members and others in the community, especially non-farmers, including farm contractors, farm employees, seed reps and stock agents. Help included visits and phone calls (where possible), assistance with snow raking and feeding out, lending machinery (tractors, bail feeders, bull-dozers), grading roads and driveways, clearing trees, lending generators, removing dead stock, babysitting, cooking meals and washing clothes, and providing food parcels.
Many farmers mentioned that the snow helped to renew and reinvigorate community spirit and community networks. Most admitted that although they were overwhelmed by support, although in a way they expected it from their community, as:
“That is the kind of community we have here.” (Intensive sheep farmer).
Most farmers now have less confidence in Civil Defence/local government, but are proud of their community and believe it has been strengthened.
Time out
The effects of the snow storm continued to be felt throughout the community long after the snow cleared. Many farmers noted that the snow ‘put them back a bit’ both financially and psychologically. The cumulative effects of damage to the farm and equipment, coupled with the flow-on financial effects of delayed maintenance and upgrading meant that many farmers were unable to take a break between seasons. This lack of ‘time-out’, both from the farming year and the devastation of the snow event, had the potential to be tremendously damaging to farmers.
In the Mayfield community of Ashburton district, former National Coordinator for Rural Women, May Greenslade, developed a useful tool for offering farmers a brief respite from the ongoing stress of being on the farm. Working with the Ashburton District Council, and with the generosity of many city-dwellers, a number of baches or cribs were made available for a couple of nights away from the stress of being constantly confronted with the work of getting the farm back on track.
Contact for Enquiries
North Island
Phil Journeaux
Manager
North Island Regions
Sector Performance Policy
MAF Policy
Private Bag 3123
Hamilton
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 7 957 8314
Fax: +64 7 957 8315
South Island
John Greer
Regional Team Leader
Natural Resources Group
MAF Policy
PO Box 20 280
Christchurch
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 3 943 1703
Fax: +64 3 943 1757
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