5. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

5.1 Conclusions - Israel
  1. Israeli Citrus exporting was carried out by a single desk Marketing Board during the period 1948 to 1991.
  2. Israel Citrus had a long period of decline prior to reform.
  3. The old Israeli regime which included single desk selling has significant pooling problems.
  4. Israel abandoned single desk selling for Citrus Fruit in 1991.
  5. The Israeli citrus industry has not collapsed since reform, nor is there any significant evidenceof chaos at the time of deregulation.
  6. The Israeli citrus industry has rebounded during the last five years. This may or may not have been caused by the reforms. The Israeli reforms did not eliminate the Citrus Marketing Board. It remains with a diminished role, and seems to be generally supportive of interventions.
  7. The Israeli Citrus industry now appears to be largely supportive of the new marketing regime.
  8. The Israeli citrus industry has numerous challenges for the future relating to the industry legislation, the transparency of the Board, barriers to entry and the future of State involvement.
  9. A major commercial issue currently is the appropriate use of brands and brand families.
5.2 Conclusions - South Africa
  1. South Africa had a long period of intervention in agricultural markets. This tradition was strengthened by the older South African regime seeking to get around the trade sanctions associated with apartheid.
  2. South Africa legislated to abandon all single desk selling for agricultural and horticultural products as from the end of 1997.
  3. South African reforms have been driven in large part by the new government's view that the statutory marketing arrangements violated constitutional rights and benefited a few at the expense of the country as a whole.
  4. South African reforms are designed to take account of the views of farmers, consumers, emerging farmers, the agricultural trade and the agricultural economics profession.
  5. South African reforms have been facilitated by a National Agricultural Marketing Council which has supervised the transition process.
  6. The South African reforms allow for joint action voluntarily or via legislation when approved by the Minister of Agriculture who receives guidance from the National Agricultural Marketing Council. The Minister will not approve any proposal that violates any one goal of the Act and this in essence prohibits single channel exporting.
  7. The National Agricultural Marketing Council has to make difficult decisions in recommending or not recommending approval for levies for research and other joint actions.
  8. The South African reforms are very new but already they have generated substantial entrepreneurial activity. The incumbents have taken action to protect their supply but new business forms are emerging.
  9. South African farmers and growers seem more concerned about crime, water law and labour law than about the marketing of their products.
5.3 Conclusions - Argentina
  1. Argentine wheat exporting declined during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of economy wide and sectoral decline.
  2. During the 1970s the Argentine Wheat Board lost its statutory monopoly but it still had a major role, particularly through its control of elevator terminals and port facilities.
  3. In 1991 the board was abolished as part of economy wide reforms.
  4. The Wheat Board infrastructure assets were distributed by open tender.
  5. The reforms in total have resulted in increased infrastructure investment and reduced transport costs.
  6. The Argentina wheat industry is now expanding and is once again a significant player in international grain markets.

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