The Decision
| 4. | I have decided that permission to import the RCD virus as a biological control agent for rabbits should be refused. | |
| This means that the virus will continue to be classified as an unwanted organism in terms of the Biosecurity Act 1993. | ||
| 5. | There are three principal reasons for deciding not to permit the introduction of the RCD virus | |
| (a) | the poor understanding of the epidemiology of the RCD virus and the disease it produces; | |
| (b) | the significant uncertainty as to the likely effectiveness of the virus as a biocontrol agent (as proposed by the Applicant Group) or even to act cost-effectively as a biocidal agent; | |
| (c) | the inadequacy of the biological control management programme proposed by the Applicant Group to deal with the uncertainties and risks which are now apparent, and the legal basis for management of the virus. | |
| 6. | Other issues and matters of concern raised by the consultation process are discussed below and in the CVO’s report to me. Four issues stood out above the others in terms of the level of interest namely: | |
- risk of RCD to humans;
- risk of RCD to species other than the rabbit;
- potential of the RCD virus to mutate and initiate an adverse epidemiological event;
- risks associated with prey switching by rabbit predators and the potential for changes in predator guilds.
For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that these issues would not in themselves be reasons for not permitting the importation of the RCD virus.
| 7. | It is important to note that if the original timetable for the joint Australia - New Zealand research programme could have been followed, this decision would be unlikely tohave been taken until 1998 at the earliest. Our current lack of understanding of RCD as a tool for biological control is a serious impediment to rational decision making. | |
| 8. | It could be suggested that the arrival of the virus is inevitable and that if the risks outlined in paragraph 6 are low, some experimentation and trialing is appropriate. | |
| Professor Robin Fordham said | ||
| "Although introductions of species to new areas can usefully be conducted as experiments from which much can be learned, for RCD virus that approach is unavailable because containment of the virus once it is released outside the laboratory is impossible. Thus calls for trial releases in the field are scientifically, and ecologically appropriate, but cannot be met. Best-estimate comparisons of New Zealand with other countries already carrying RCD virus remain the only option." | ||
| The Applicant Group responded | ||
| " Other reviewers do not appear to understand this and have made the unrealistic recommendation that field trials should be conducted in New Zealand. As Fordham says, this is not a practical option." | ||
Contact for Enquiries
Manager, Strategic Science Team
MAF Biosecurity New Zealand
PO Box 2526
Wellington
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 4 894 0115
Fax: +64 4 894 0731
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