4.0 The Intended RCD Release Programme
4.1 Uncontrolled introduction and release
I consider the probability of accidental introduction of the virus to be low given New Zealand’s isolation from sources of the virus and the current border controls. On the other hand, I regard the probability of illegal introduction to be much higher notwithstanding the heavy penalties available under the Biosecurity Act. The probability of a "successful" illegal introduction is very difficult to assess.
The decision not to permit the introduction of the virus means that it retains its status as an "unwanted organism" in terms of the Biosecurity Act, and under current policy the initial response to its discovery will be to contain and eradicate.
The inevitability of introduction of the virus is a widely held view and it has been suggested that this should have a bearing on the decision on the application. I do not share this view. I have considered the application on its merits.
4.2 Controlled introduction and release
The Application provides a creditable outline of a programme for introduction and release of the RCD virus. However, it drew significant criticism from peer reviewers and some submitters because of its failure to adequately deal with (among other
issues)
- goals and objectives of rabbit control and the role of RCD in that programme;
- lack of description of integrated pest management;
- inadequate treatment of resource requirements for monitoring and surveillance, research and mitigation of adverse effects such as prey switching by predators;
- regulatory basis for manipulation and release of the virus.
The CVO’s report provides a summary of other points raised by reviewers and submitters.
| The Application (p85) states that | ||
| "The goal of the release of RCD in New Zealand is equivocal because the nature and extent of the rabbit problem vary greatly, and the spread and persistence of RCD are uncertain". | ||
At that time, the Applicant Group had a more optimistic view of the likely success of RCD as a biocontrol agent than can now be considered the case.
In the light of current knowledge of RCD and the uncertainty of its performance in New Zealand, a much higher degree of national coordination of planning and resourcing would be needed.
It is important that we learn from the Australian experience where resources are fragmented, coordination is poor, distribution of the virus is poorly understood and understanding of the factors which are crucial to improving the performance of the virus as a biocontrol agent is still lacking.
While it is most appropriate that the delivery of RCD virus in the field be in the hands of regional councils operating under their regional pest management strategies, a more complete technical and financial under-pinning of the programme is necessary and this will involve greater involvement of stakeholders at a national level and coordination of their resources.
Contact for Enquiries
Manager, Strategic Science Team
MAF Biosecurity New Zealand
PO Box 2526
Wellington
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 4 894 0115
Fax: +64 4 894 0731
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