Collective Responsibility for Investment Purposes

The approach described above is designed to address "negative" aspects of resource use, by requiring resource users to take responsibility for damage caused. But collective responsibility is also a mechanism that facilitates investment for positive purposes, ie to enhance the income or other objectives of a consortium. Thus, in fisheries, a quotaholder association, once formed, can agree to set aside a certain area as a breeding ground, or levy its members to fund research on more effective fishing methods. In catchments, consortium members could elect to invest in irrigation or flood protection projects.

In several instances, the New Zealand government has provided mechanisms for mandatory levies to fund "public goods" such as irrigation and drainage projects, commodity research and promotion, and pest management. In all of these cases, government has recognised that "public goods" should be paid for by those who benefit and/or those who generate the need, but that a mechanism of collective responsibility is needed to prevent free-riding.

The case for collective responsibility mechanisms to address environmental damage is at least as strong as the case for mechanisms for income-generating investments, although it may be less politically attractive.

The Choice of Voluntary vs Mandatory Approaches

When should landusers be required to meet environmental standards under tlrreat of fines or enforcement action? When should they be offered incentives and encouragement, possibly subsidies? Foran et al suggested foregoing all penalties as long as a consortium demonstrates due diligence in attempting to meet standards. The question of the proper amount of coercion remains one of significant debate among government officials in New Zealand, at both central and regional level.

Bradsen (1990, 1991) argues that a voluntary approach to sustainable land management does not work. For example, he says, decades of soil conservation subsidies in the United States have failed to make a significant impact on soil erosion. At the same time, Bradsen considers that simply imposing rules and trying to enforce them through the courts will not achieve the desired results.

Bralsen advocates something in between: that landusers be given the tools to manage the adverse effects of their land use, and that they be required to draw up farm plans to do so. Fines would be an absolute last resort. A shortcoming of Bradsen's approach is that he does not explain how targets or standards should be set, or how compliance should be measured, making it difficult to determine whether a group has met its responsibilities other than in an administrative sense. (See Ackroyd (1992) for a further critique of Bradsen's ideas.)

To be effective, an approach to non-point source pollution must ensure that the responsible parties, acting individually or collectively, take appropriate action. Implementing collective responsibility for NPS pollution problems, with clear standards and clear consequences for failure to achieve them, accomplishes this. While catchment management consortia or quotaholder associations should be allowed sufficient time to initiate monitoring and to develop and implement a strategy, it is also important that the wider community have some assurance that progress will be made.

If the landusers or fishers themselves have been given an opportunity and failed to adequately address an issue, there will be greater moral authority, and therefore public support, for fines or regulatory controls on management practices. Thus, a regional council or fisheries management agency might start with an approach based on diligence and eventually move towards fines if those responsible fail to resolve the problem. Some sociological research on compliance with regulatory controls vs voluntary measures in New Zealand would be useful.

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